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THERE is hardly a problem which occupies the leading intel-
lects in political science more than this one : which political
system is to be preferred—democracy or dictatorship?
The catastrophic conclusion of the world war brought with it
the resultant decline of democracy. With due consideration for the
antique democracy, we are justified in regarding America as the
mother of modern democracy. In this relation two facts have the
same symptomatic or symbolic importance. The first one is Lafay-
ette's crossing the Atlantic at the close of the American Revolution
bearing the message from the democracy of America to the fellow-
men of the great French Revolution. The second one is Wilson's
crossing the Atlantic bearing his message of the fourteen points
to exhausted Europe—this message destined to become the doctrine
of democratic self-government in Europe.
Eight years of post-war life have shown us democracy passing
the peak, having failed to become the salvation of the world which it
was supposed to have been. Obviously the nations—for instance
Czechoslovakia, Austria. Poland, etc.—supposedly lil^erated at the
conclusion of the world war, are less happy in this period of democ-
racy than they were before. A few examples taken at random will
well illustrate this. The red ghost of Bolshevistic Dictatorship is a
warning sign to the nations governed democratically. The dictator-
ship of Mussolini, and the terrorism of a Horthy are symptoms of a
malady with which democracy is obviously afflicted. W'e can think
as we will of the collapse of the recent British coal strike—but
nobody, not even Baldwin, would undertake to consider this terri-
ble loss to the British Commonwealth, this enervating civil war as
the democratic expression of the people. The movements in China
are chaotic and do not yet allow conclusions as to their final result:
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despotism or democracy. Democracy is thus threatened wherever
we look. And she is endangered especially in those countries where,
in spite of her seemingly powerful position, she has failed to ful-
fil her tasks. Almost nowhere has democracy carried out her
promise.
Everybody deeply concerned with the preservation of the politi-
cal culture of this world is disquieted by the crisis of democracy
—
Democracy appeared to us as a matter of course. So much more we
feel the blows it receives everwhere. The solution of the situation,
which is much sought-after, can be found only by visualizing the
essence of democracy. It is of great importance to meditate about
the aims of democracy, and to examine the accuracy and us-efulness
of the means, by which she endeavors to realize these aims.
The principal purpose of democracy is to execute the \vill of the
people through elected representatives. It was therefore one of the
first tasks of democracy to remove the system of absolutism by the
institution of universal suffrage. But it was already known, pre-
vious to the war. that the parliaments did not represent the proper
means for enacting the will of the people—a fact becoming- oven
more evident during the war, an event which could have hardly been
the intention of so many nations. And events up to date seem to
prove this conclusively.
The cjuestion necessarily arises : what is the purpose of parliamen-
tary representation? Professon Jellinek, the founder of the modern
theory of the state, and other scientists and political tliinkers who
agree with hun, state the purpose of parliamentary representat'on
to be the creation of u living body representing ach'velv the will of
the entire community. But are the existing parliaments truly of
tills sort? Can we ju<.ilv regard them as real represontat'vcs o*: the
will of the people"
In the light of most favorable observation, the parliaments of
today represent the various shades of opinion among the electorate—-
i. e.. tlie people. They still conform to INIirabeau's statement that
parliaments out foiijours Ics niciucs proportions que Voriginal. But
is the will of the people, supposedly represented by parliaments,
merely a summary of the v^'ill of amass of indix-iihials? Is it not
rational to believe this concerted will of the people to be a thing
essentially new, a thing of higher order, a self-sustaining organism?
fs it not that the wills of the individuals are su.l)ordinated to this con-
certed will of the people?
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The analysis of the proposition will prove that the concerted will
of the people is fundamentally divided into two parts of which the
first one is essentially ideal, the second one resulting from empiri-
cal necessity.
The will by empirical necessity is a summation of the diver-
sified and most often contradictory desires of the people, who are
able to manifest these desires directly or indirectly. This is the
proper domain of democracy where the politician may seek the
will of his electorate. But does he really seek the facts, or are his
suggestive questions merely asked to be answered to his complete
satisfaction? Practise of the latter sort explains why the average
man's common sense suspects so often the demagogue in the demo-
crat. And while there is no true reason to deny to the democrats
only the honafides, it has to be admitted that demagogism is to the
democrat not only a great danger, but also a welcome refuge in case
of emergency. The close relation between democracy and dema-
gogism is founded upon the very essence of the empirical will of
the people.
Were the empirical will the true will of the people, then the ex-
istence of democracy would be justified—then democracy could
grasp the problem of human society, being de la neme proportion que
['original. The justification of democracy depends therefore upon
the question—which comes nearer the the true will of the people, the
empirical or the ideal ?
The ideal will of society is of the nature of a regulative principle.
The empirical will is apparently the will that is,—the ideal the will
that ought to be. It is the will sub specie aeierni in contrast to the
will of the day. Whatever is regarded commonly to be the will of
the people, is at best the will of a majority. This point of view
is necessarily dependent on statistics and matters of everyday's ex-
perience. And because of this, democracy is denied the opportunity
to view the will of the people from any other perspective. The
ideal will of the people is beyond our conception, for it is a thing es-
sentially different, the thing that ought to be—a problem beyond
democracy's empirical practice. The ideal will of the people is—to
em.phasize it again—the only true will of society.
From this point of view the whole of society must be considered.
"The whole is the creative principle", to use a term proper to the
new Kant-ian philosophy, that links the individuals into a unity with
purpose. The whole is more than the summation of the parts. It
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is the synthesis which gives to each and every part the proper place
in society. The whole is the fundamental principle which governs
the life of society. This principle is independent from the genera]
practise of suffrage and every-day poHtics which direct democracy.
It can not be calculated. It must be conceived spiritually.
This conception applied to the reality of social life consequently
leads to the dictatorship. The dictatorship stands above the person-
al interests of the individual. It is directed solely by the materializa-
tion of an ethical principle for the benefit of the community. Dic-
tatorship refuses to consider individual desires while democracy
must. It is the conscious and necessary exclusion of all the varying
mdividual desires that forms the superiority of dictatorship to de-
mocracy. The purpose of dictatorial policy is the well-being of so-
ciety. The dictator is justified by the necessity of social ethics.
A justification of this sort is admittedly not without danger to a
steady course of political life. But it argues for the higher quality
of dictatorship in that it rests upon this ethical positivism. To dic-
tatorship negativism has necessarily greater danger than to democ-
racy which looks indifferently upon right and wrong. The possibil-
ity of an aberration into negativism proves the positive quality of
dictatorship—the exceptional declining more intensely than the
average. Democracy is constant but insufficient. Dictatorship is
\ariable but always complete— right or wrong. Which is the lesser
evil? Which is preferable?
Democracy not only is, but remains the lesser evil in permanency.
Dictatorship, though the major evil at times, endeavors to create the
real good actively, while democracy responds only in reaction. Dic-
tatorship liberates the individual by liberating the whole of society
—
and thus it solves the problem of personal liberty. Democracy aims
to liberate the individual by application of majority-rule. Its liliera-
tion resulting from purely mechanical means, is merely s.eparation
finally identical to isolation. It is liberation only in appearance
that of dictatorship in reality.
It is vain to expect democracy as analyzed above to contribute
toward a betterment of our social life. We may expect, however,
that the new conception of liberty in dictatorship will bring us the
realization of our hopes of the ideal society. Let us face the neces-
sity of rejuvenation of our social order. Diicciif fata z'olcuitcui,
iiolcntcm trahiint.
